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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS OFFICE
425 Eye Street N.W.
BCIS, AAO, 20 Mass, 3/F
Washington, D.C. 20536

PUBLIC COPY

[redacted]

FILE: [redacted] Office: Los Angeles Date: JUL 03 2003

IN RE: Applicant: [redacted]

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under Section 212 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

[redacted]

identifying data deleted to prevent clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or the analysis used in reaching the decision was inconsistent with the information provided or with precedent decisions, you may file a motion to reconsider. Such a motion must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions. Any motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required under 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i).

If you have new or additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reopen. Such a motion must state the new facts to be proved at the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence. Any motion to reopen must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reopen, except that failure to file before this period expires may be excused in the discretion of the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (Bureau) where it is demonstrated that the delay was reasonable and beyond the control of the applicant or petitioner. *Id.*

Any motion must be filed with the office that originally decided your case along with a fee of $110 as required under 8 C.F.R. § 103.7.

Robert P. Wiemann, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the Acting District Director, Los Angeles, California, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Mexico who was present in the United States without a lawful admission or parole in August 1986. She was found to be inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), for having attempted to procure admission into the United States by fraud or willful misrepresentation on December 14, 1996. The applicant married a lawful permanent resident in November 1976 in Mexico, and she is the beneficiary of an approved Petition for Alien Relative. The applicant seeks the above waiver under section 212(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i).

The acting district director concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed on a qualifying relative and denied the application accordingly.

On appeal, counsel discusses the applicant's four children, [redacted] age 24, [redacted] age 21, [redacted] age 19 and [redacted] age 16. Counsel states that three of the children are lawful permanent residents and one is a U.S. citizen. Counsel suggests that the qualifying relative, the applicant's husband, would face great emotional, psychological and financial hardship if his wife of 26 years were not allowed to immigrate.

The record reflects that the applicant attempted to procure admission into the United States on December 14, 1996, by presenting a Resident Alien Card belonging to another person, [redacted] On December 18, 1996, the applicant was ordered excluded and deported by an immigration judge. She was removed on December 18, 1996. During this entire process, the applicant never revealed her true name. The record contains a handwritten statement by the applicant dated August 3, 1999, given under oath in the presence of her husband and a Bureau officer, that she unlawfully reentered the United States on January 21, 1997. Such a return without permission to reapply for admission is a violation of section 276 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1326, and a felony.

The record also reflects that the applicant was apprehended on December 13, 1996, after unlawfully entering the United States. She used the name [redacted] at that time and was voluntarily returned to Mexico.

Section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act provides, in part, that:

> (i) Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or

admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

Section 212(i) of the Act provides that:

> (1) The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security] may, in the discretion of the Attorney General, waive the application of clause (i) of subsection (a)(6)(C) in the case of an alien who is the spouse, son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that the refusal of admission to the United States of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such an alien.
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> (2) No court shall have jurisdiction to review a decision or action of the Attorney General regarding a waiver under paragraph (1).

Section 212(i) of the Act provides that a waiver of the bar to admission resulting from section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act is dependent first upon a showing that the bar imposes an extreme hardship on a qualifying family member. Although extreme hardship is a requirement for section 212(i) relief, once established, it is but one favorable discretionary factor to be considered. *See Matter of Mendez*, 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996).

In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. 560 (BIA 1999), the Board of Immigration Appeals (the Board) stipulated that the factors deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act include, but are not limited to, the following: the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and finally, significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate.

The Board in *Cervantes-Gonzalez* also referred to *Silverman v. Rogers*, 437 F.2d 102 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied 402 U.S. 983 (1971), where the court stated that, "even assuming that the Federal Government had no right either to prevent a marriage or destroy it, we believe that here it has done nothing more than to say that the residence of one of the marriage partners may not be in the United States."

Although the applicant alleges financial hardship in this matter, the Board referred to *Shooshtary v. INS*, 39 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 1994), in which the court stated that the "extreme hardship requirement of section 212(h)(2) of the Act was not enacted to insure that the family members of excludable aliens fulfill their dreams or continue in the lives which they currently enjoy."

In *Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, the Board also held that the underlying fraud or misrepresentation may be considered as an adverse factor in adjudicating a section 212(i) waiver application in the exercise of discretion. *Matter of Tijam*, 22 I&N 408 (BIA 1998), followed. The Board noted that the United States Supreme Court ruled in *INS v. Yueh-Shaio Yang*, 519 U.S. 26 (1996), that the Attorney General (now referred to as the Secretary) has the authority to consider any and all negative factors, including the respondent's initial fraud.

The court held in *INS v. Jong Ha Wang*, 450 U.S. 139 (1981), that the mere showing of economic detriment to qualifying family members is insufficient to warrant a finding of extreme hardship.

There are no laws that require a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident who is not in removal proceedings to leave the United States and live abroad. Further, the common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. *See Hassan v. INS*, 927 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1991). The uprooting of family and separation from friends does not necessarily amount to extreme hardship but rather represents the type of inconvenience and hardship experienced by the families of most aliens being deported.

A review of the documentation in the record, when considered in its totality, reflects that the applicant has failed to show that the qualifying relative would suffer extreme hardship over and above the normal economic and social disruptions involved in the removal of a family member.

The grant or denial of the above waiver does not turn only on the issue of the meaning of "extreme hardship." It also hinges on the discretion of the Attorney General and pursuant to such terms, conditions, and procedures as he may by regulations prescribe.

The favorable factors in this matter include the applicant's family ties, the absence of a criminal record, and potential hardship to the qualifying relative (her spouse).

The unfavorable factors include the applicant's unlawful entries, her use of a false name when apprehended for illegal entry, her attempt to procure admission into the United States by fraud (a felony), her being excluded and deported, her unlawful reentry without permission to reapply for admission (a felony), and her lengthy stay in the United States without Service authorization.

The applicant's actions in this matter cannot be condoned. The unfavorable factors in this matter outweigh the favorable ones. In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.